| Titre : | Lying about delegation |
| Auteurs : | Angela SUTAN ; Radu VRANCEANU ; Groupe ESC Dijon Bourgogne |
| Type de document : | Article |
| Année de publication : | 2016 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Sources : | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
| Concepts : | Decisions & comportements |
| Mots-clés : |
[Aciège 2017] DELEGATION DE RESPONSABILITE [Aciège 2017] JEU SERIEUX |
| Résumé : | This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which theProposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowmentwith a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whetherthe delegation is effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat” role, while thedecision is made by the Proposer himself. In this uncertain attribution setting, the Proposercan send an unverifiable message declaring his delegation strategy. One possible strategy is“false delegation”, in which the Proposer makes the decision but claims to have delegatedit. In our sample, the recourse to false delegation is significant, and a significant number ofpotential Delegates accept serving in the scapegoat role. However, there are many honestProposers, and 20% of all Delegates will refuse to be the accomplices of a dishonest Proposer.Responders tend to more readily accept poor offers in a setup that permits lying aboutdelegation; the acceptance rate of the poor offer is the highest when Delegates can refusethe scapegoat role.| |
| Numéro : | 121 |
| Pagination : | pp. 29-40 |
| Date : | 01/01/2016 |
| Citation norme APA : | Sutan, A., Vranceanu, R. Lying about Delegation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2016, vol. 121, p. 29-40 |
| Document numérique : | Pour voir le document numérique, pensez à vous identifier |
Documents numériques (1)
 Lying about delegation Adobe Acrobat PDF |
